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BREAKING FROM THE HURD:
MISSOURI REJECTS EIGHTH
CIRCUIT-AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POST-
HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Inc.'
Alsbach v. Bader2
In the past two years courts handed down decisions directly affecting
Missouri practice concerning whether, or when, it is proper to use hypnosis
as an aid to refreshing a witness' memory in a civil action. The first of these
decisions, Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors,3 was decided by a three judge
panel of the Eighth Circuit and represents their first attempt to deal with this
issue.4 The rule suggested in Spryncynatyk provides for the conditional ad-
missibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in those cases in which the hyp-
nosis procedure used can be shown to be likely to produce reasonably accurate
"'memories."
The second of these decisions, Alsbach v. Bader,5 was handed down by
the Missouri Supreme Court and is a complete rejection of prior Missouri
case law .6 In place of the old rule, which held that the hypnosis of a witness
created a question of credibility for the jury to consider, the court in Alsbach
adopted a rule of per se exclusion for hypnotically influenced testimony, to
the extent that it is the product of the hypnotic session. Neither Alsbach nor
Sprynczynatyk forbids the previously hypnotized witness from testifying con-
ceming matters remembered and related before the hypnotic session.
7
The Missouri decision rejects the conditional admissibility approach of
the Eighth Circuit and in doing so creates conflicting rules on the admissibility
of hypnotically influenced testimony. Both courts, in keeping with the an-
alytical approach used in other jurisdictions, characterize the problem as one
1. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986).
2. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
3. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. (1986).
4. 771 F.2d at 1119, 1123; see United States v. Harvey, 756 F.2d 636, 644-45
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 97 (1985) (avoided until later date the question of
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed memory).
5. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
6. See, e.g., State v. Barteau, 687 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State
v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
7. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 824.
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of the admissibility of evidence and not the competency of the witness. As
such, the federal courts are not bound by the state evidentiary rules8 and
since the Eighth Circuit rule is completely devoid of Constitutional consid-
erations, the Missouri courts are not affected by the federal rule on the
question.9
8. It should be noted that this problem was not treated as a question of
witness competency by either court. Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 826 (summarily dis-
missing appellee's argument that the situation was controlled by Mo. REv. STAT. §
491.060 (1978), which deals with competency requirements); Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d
at 1122 (while acknowledging that competency questions are governed by state law,
declaring, without further explanation, that the present case dealt with the admissi-
bility of evidence and was thus a question to be decided under federal law).
The Federal Rules of Evidence, by virtue of having been enacted by Congress,
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1959 (1975), are applicable in the federal courts without
regard to state rules of evidence unless the use of the state rule is mandated by the
applicable federal rule. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). Under
the doctrine of Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the only argument for non-
implementation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is that Congress exceeded its power
to regulate the federal courts in enacting the rules. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, Illinois, 701 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983). Since
the rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court and submitted to Congress for
enactment, this argument would appear exceedingly futile.
Had the Sprynczynatyk court chosen to decide the question as one of competency
of the previously hypnotized witness, FED. R. Evm. 601 would apply, and where there
was state law on the issue, it would be used to determine how the testimony was to
be treated: "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided
in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, in which state law supplies
the rule of decision, the competency of the witness shall be determined in accordance
with state law." Id.
However only one court has used incompetency to exclude hypnotically enhanced
testimony. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981). This rule was later
modified in State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266
(1982), to state that the testimony enhanced by the hypnotic session would be in-
admissible but that the witness was not incompetent as to those matters remembered
and' communicated before hypnosis.
9. Although some state courts have considered the question of whether hyp-
notically influenced testimony violates a criminal defendant's due process rights and
right to confront the witness, see infra note 46, at the federal level the problems
encountered have been held not to rise to the level of constitutional infirmity. See
Clay v. Vose, 599 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1985).
However, under specific facts, courts have found constitutional violations entailing
the use of hypnosis. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (police department's
use of psychiatrist with considerable knowledge of hypnosis to interrogate prisoner
held to violate due process where "an already physically and emotionally exhausted
suspect's ability to resist interrogation was broken to almost trance-like submission");
United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694, 697-98 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (lack of record
of hypnotic session of key prosecution witness, coupled with the death, before trial,
of the hypnotist held to preclude effective cross-examination of witness and required
exclusion of the hypnotically influenced testimony); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp.
1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (attempt to bolster credibility of key prosecution witness through
undisclosed and unprincipled use of hypnosis among Constitutional violations held
to require habeas corpus relief).
2
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The purpose of this Note is to present some of the scientific and legal
theories relevant to the issue of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony in an effort to aid understanding of the decisions and the problems
encountered under each rule.
On July 16, 1980, fourteen year old Rodney Sprynczynatyk was driving
his parents' 1980 Chevrolet Citation with his mother Vivian Sprynczynatyk
riding in the passenger seat. While negotiating a steep downhill grade on a
gravel road Rodney lost control of the car. The Citation left the road and
overturned. Rodney escaped with minor injuries; however, as a result of
injuries sustained in the wreck, his mother was rendered a quadraplegic. °
Donald and Vivian Sprynczynatyk filed this suit in the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota alleging negligence and strict
liability against General Motors (GM) and seeking actual damages for Vi-
vian's injuries and for loss of her consortium and services. Rodney was not
a party to the suit. Specifically the Sprynczynatyks claimed that the accident
had been caused by a defect in design of the rear brakes of the Citation."
This defect had been the cause of the recent "X-car" litigation against GM.' 2
The X-car design configuration, which is the basis for the Citation, is alleged
to have been designed with an unreasonably dangerous rear brake system
which causes the brakes to lock up when forcefully applied.' 3 This can result
in the car being thrown into an uncontrollable slide.
Before trial young Rodney gave two depositions. In each of these he
testified that he had not, to the best of his recollection, applied the brakes
before the car went out of control. 4 Before trial, at his parents' attorney's
request, Rodney was hypnotized by a psychologist, Dr. Gordon, and asked
to relive the events of July 16, 1980. At this time he said that he had applied
the brakes before the car went out of control.' This session was videotaped.' 6
Before trial GM made a motion in limine to prevent the hypnotically
induced testimony and the videotapes of the session from being introduced
into evidence. The court denied the motion, but only after the issue had been
argued and briefed by the parties. 7 At trial the plaintiffs first introduced the
testimony of Dr. Gordon and in conjuction with the testimony and over
GM's objection, showed the jury the videotape of the hypnotic session. GM
requested an instruction cautioning the jury not to accept the videotape for
the truth of the matters asserted therein. The court refused the requested
10. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1114.
11. Id.
12. For more background information concerning the" X-car litigation, see
Thronton, A Case History of the X-Car, TRAL, July 1985, at 22.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1115.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1116.
19861 795.
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instruction, but did caution the jury that the tapes were being shown as
evidence of the credibility of the witness. 's
Only after this evidence had been presented did Rodney Sprynczynatyk
take the witness stand. His testimony was substantially the same as his an-
swers while under hypnosis. GM later presented evidence by Dr. Martin Orne,
a leading authority on the subject of hypnosis, in an effort to impeach
Rodney's credibility. 9
The jury returned a verdict of 4.5 million dollars on Vivian Sprynczyn-
tyk's claims and $525,000 on her husband Donald's, from which G.M. ap-
pealed.10
In reversing the jury verdict, the Sprynczynatyk court considered whether
the presentation of the videotapes of the hypnotic session during the plain-
tiffs' case in chief was proper and whether the subsequent limiting instruction
was sufficient. The admission of the video tape during the plaintiff's case in
chief was held to be reversible error in that this practice constituted the
rehabilitation of an unimpeached witness. The court pointed out that the
proper procedure in such a case is to present the main witness and introduce
the testimony of the hypnotist only if the opposing side chooses to impeach
the witness on the basis of hypnosis. 2 A videotape of the session is admissible
only if the opposing party attacks the procedures used or questions asked
during the hypnotic session. 22 The court also found prejudicial error in the
refusal of the offered instruction. Although both the offered instruction and
the given instruction were technically correct, the refusal in the hearing of
the jury of GM's instruction, which clearly pointed out that the evidence
was not to be used as the truth of the matters asserted in the videotape,
created the prejudicial impression that the testimony could in fact be used
for the truth of the matters asserted on the videotape. 23 The case was re-
18. The instruction given by the trial court:
Ladies and gentlemen, the tapes that you are about to see are being received
on the issue of - the ultimate issue of the credibility of the recall of the
witness, Rodney Sprynczynatyk, and we aren't here - the purpose of them
is to permit you to see it and you will be receiving other evidence on this
subject both on the part of the plaintiff and contrary evidence from the
defendant. And the purpose of viewing the tapes is to permit you to evaluate
the opinions that you will subsequently hear.
Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1116.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1118; see also United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
22. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1124.
23. Id. at 1117-18. The circuit court held that although the instruction did
give a technically correct use of the videotape, i.e. for the assessment of Rodney's
credibility, the purpose for which the tape was admitted was for the probative truth
of the assertions therein. The court noted that it did not require instructions on the
796 [Vol. 51
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manded for retrial consistent with the opinion.24 The court then proceeded
to give instructions for dealing with the testimony of Rodney Sprynczynatyk
on retrial.
25
In the early morning hours of June 2, 1979, an automobile driven by
Carl J. Alsbach collided with a pickup truck driven by Margaret Sue Bader
on a two-lane highway in Jefferson County, Missouri. 26 The Alsbach auto,
which was eastbound, came to rest at a forty-five degree angle with its front
end protruding into the westbound lane.2 7 The Bader vehicle came to rest on
an embankment to the north of the westbound lane. There was no other
physical evidence that could shed light on the cause of the accident. Alsbach
had no memory of the accident other than remembering a single headlight
approaching his vehicle in the westbound lane. 2
On June 26, 1979, Alsbach filed suit against Bader and her employer,
alleging that the Bader truck was travelling at an excessive speed and was
on the wrong side of the road. This allegation was denied by Bader who
made identical allegations against Alsbach. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance intervened as Alsbach's uninsured motorist carrier.2 9
On January 24, 1981, Alsbach was hypnotized by a psychiatrist, Dr.
Ulett, in an attempt to improve his recollection of the events of June 2,
1979.30 During the session Mr. Alsbach recalled having seen two headlights
approaching his vehicle rather than the single light originally reported. Im-
prohibited use of evidence in every case where such an instruction is mandated under
FED. R. EvID. 105. However, under these facts refusal to instruct on the prohibited
use was reversible error. Id.
24. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1118.
25. Preliminary to the decision on the merits, the court first ruled that the
denial of G.M.'s motion in limine satisfied the requirement for an objection found
in FED. R. EvID. 103 (a)(1). The opinion notes that the court's pretrial ruling was
made after full argument and briefing on the subject and was definitive for the
purpose of the suit. The court also relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 46, which requires only
an effective objection, not a formal exception to a ruling. This analysis is contrary
to previous Eighth Circuit decisions, which have required an in court objection to
preserve the point for appeal. See Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d
1322 (8th Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein. The Sprynczynatyk analysis follows the
reasoning of American Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d
321 (3d Cir. 1985), in that it differentiates between the motion in limine decided upon
hypothetical grounds and those situations, as was the case here, where the motion is
denied in light of undisputed facts and is definitive. In such a case the requirement
for an in court objection becomes a technicality in direct contravention of the purpose
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Crv. P. 46.
26. The truck Bader was driving at the time of the accident was owned by
her employer, Gretson Corbitt. Corbitt was named as a co-defendant in the suit.
Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 823.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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mediately after the session Alsbach's recall improved to the point that he
was able to remember that Bader's vehicle had crossed the center line and
struck him in the eastbound lane.3 '
State Farm filed a motion in limine to prevent Alsbach from testifying
concerning the hypnotic procedure or the fruits of the session.12 This motion
was sustained, as well as an objection on the same issue entered at trial.
Subsequently the trial court entered judgment for the defendants on AIs-
bach's failure to make a submissible case."
Alsbach appealed the trial court's ruling to the Eastern District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals. 4 The appellate court held that the trial court
was in error in refusing to further examine the circumstances of Alsbach's
hypnotic experience and rule on the reliability of the procedures used by Dr.
Ulet.3s On application of the defendants the supreme court transferred 36 the
case and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the testimony was inadmissible
as a result of having been procured through the use of hypnosis. 7 The
decision in Alsbach represents a reversal of previous criminal appellate hold-
ings which ruled that hypnosis presents a question of credibilty and not
admissability of testimony. 8
To understand the courts' analysis, it is necessary to consider some of
the problems inherent in the use of hypnosis as a memory restoration device.
The question of whether hypnosis has a place in the legal system has been
discussed since the mid- nineteenth century.3 9 The inherent unreliability of
testimony that is the product of hypnotic enhancement has been well doc-
umented in judicial opinions.40 The dangers of hypnosis as they affect testi-




34. Id. at 823.
35. Id. at 823-24.
36. Pursuant to Mo. R. Civ. P. 83.03, the court may order the transfer of
any case upon the application of a party "because of the general interest or importance
of a question involved with the case, or for the purpose of re-examining existing
law." Id.
37. Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 823.
38. See supra note 6. Although the Alsbach opinion carefully frames the
question presented as one involving civil cases, the court concludes that hypnotically
influenced testimony should "not be admitted in the courts of Missouri." 700 S.W.2d
at 824.
39. See Laurence & Perry, Forensic Hypnosis in the Late Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 31 INT'L J. OF CLINCIAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 266 (1983). The first
published case in the United States to deal with the question was People v. Ebanks,
117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897) (affirmed trial court's refusal of testimony offered
by defendant that he had proclaimed his innocence while under hypnosis). "The law
of the United States does not recognize hypnotism." Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
40. See infra note 61.
798 [Vol. 51
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Suggestibility: While in a hypnotic state the subject's critical judgment
is suspended and the subject experiences an abnormal desire to comply with
the interrogator's perceived requests. Suggestions may or may not be inten-
tional on the part of the interrogator and may even be nonverbal. The subject
may also be cued by prehypnotic suggestions from other sources and his or
her perception of the purpose for the hypnotic session. 41
Confabulation or Fanstasy: While in a hypnotic state the subject may
divulge information which is completely the product of imagination or sub-
concious beliefs. This can occur either as a result of suggestion or completely
spontaneously on the part of the subject. 42
Inabilility to Distinguish: In both the hypnotic and posthypnotic state
neither the subject nor the hypnotist can positively separate memories which
are genuine from those which are the product of suggestion or confabulation.
Nor can the subject separate memories present before hypnosis from those
exposed or created while in a hypnotic state. 43
Increased Confidence: Often after the subject has undergone hypnosis,
the subject will have a heightened degree of confidence in his recollections
merely as a result of knowing the memory was exposed while in a hypnotic
state. 44 This confidence is buttressed by the tendency to confabulate a logical
story or rationale around known "facts" so as to fill in gaps or reconcile
inconsistencies. 45 This certainty is completely sincere on the part of the subject
and thus as a witness she is both "convinced and convincing. ''46
41. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Pro-
spective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313 (1980); Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis
in Court, 27 INT'L J. OF CLINIcAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311 (1979).
42. The most striking documentation of this phenomenon was done by Rubenstein
and Newman, The Living Out of "Future" Experiences Under Hypnosis, 119 ScmNcE 472
(1954). Subjects were first regressed (while in a hypnotic state) to a point in their
childhood. When questioned about their surroundings they produced a very descrip-
tive narration from a child's point of view. The subjects were then progressed to an
age ten years in the future from the date of the hypnotic session. The responses to
questions about their surroundings and activities were again very detailed and lucid.
Id. at 472.
43. Diamond, supra note 41, at 316 (citing E. HLGARD, Th EXPERMNCE OF
HYPNOsIs 6-10 (1968)). This problem has been expressed as one of the "contamina-
tion" of the prehypnotic memory with posthypnotic fantasy or psuedomemory. Cases
have been documented in which the subject become adamantly convinced of the veracity
of an intentionally suggested, but entirely ficticious, event. Id.
44. Diamond, supra note 41, at 339-40. An example of this occurence can be
found in the testimony reported in State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 737-38, 649
P.2d 845, 847 (1982) (Q: Are you sure Greg had nothing in his hand? A: Yes I am.
Q: Why are you sure? A: I was hypnotized.).
45. See Diamond, supra note 41, at 342; Orne, supra note 41, at 316.
46. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266
(1982), states that because hypnosis affects a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights, the problem of confidence may require the exclusion of the testimony even if
hypnosis were proven to be a reliable method of extracting truthful memories. Id. at
187-89, 644 P.2d at 1273-75. But cf. supra note 9.
1986] 799
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Popular Preconceptions: Since its discovery hypnosis has been the sub-
ject of much misinformation, some of it brought about by its practitioners. 47
One of the more common modern misconceptions is that the brain operates
in a manner analagous to a video recorder and that memories may be faith-
fully reproduced when the hypnotist hits the playback button.4 Not supris-
ingly, this more sensational "understanding" of hypnosis is more likely to
be known to the jury through the media than the unspectacular, but scientific,
bewilderment at the functioning of the subconcious mind. Such a misunder-
standing of the phenomenon of hypnosis by the jury, and possibly by the
court, coupled with the confidence of the subject in his story, may make the
impeachment of a witness before a jury on the basis of hypnosis exceedingly
difficult. If the jury is to be informed that a witness has been hypnotized,
it becomes necessary to refute this misconception lest the jury give the witness
undeserved credibility. 49
There are three commonly applied analyses concerning the admission of
hypnotically altered testimony. The oldest of the three originated in Harding
v. State. 0 The Harding rule, urged upon the court by the plaintiffs in both
the subject cases, states that having been hypnotized does not affect the
admissibility of the witness' testimony. The only issue created by the hypnosis
is a question of credibility for the trier of fact to decide. 5 The Harding court
reached this conclusion by categorizing the testimony as present recollection
refreshed. Therefore, the means used to refresh the memory, the hypnotic
session, is subject to scrutiny from the bench only as to whether it actually
catalyzed a dormant memory, not whether it produced an accurate recall of
facts.2
The only expert testimony before the Harding court was that of the
psychologist who had hypnotized the witness. 3 The hypnotist testified that
there was little or no chance that there had been any undue suggestion, and
that in his professional opinion the witness' account of events was reliable.
5 4
The hypnotist also stated that barring undue suggestion, hypnosis generally
produced an accurate recollection of events. 55
47. Laurence & Perry, supra note 39.
48. See H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1967).
49. Diamond, supra note 41, at 330.
50. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 949 (1969). The issue arose concerning the admissibility of the posthypnotic
testimony of the woman Harding was accused of having raped and shot.
51. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
52. See People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 384, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853
(1979); 3 WIamoRE, EVIDENCE § 758 (1961).
53. Harding, 5 Md. App. at 234-35, 246 A.2d at 306. Mr. Oropolo was found
to be qualified as an expert witness by virtue of his education as a psychologist and
his four years experience as a clinical psychologist. Id. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306.
54. Id. at 243, 246 A.2d at 310.
55. Id. at 239-40, 246 A.2d at 308. As to the credibility of these assertions
[Vol. 51800
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The rule in Harding v. State has been quoted extensively by both state
and federal courts 56 and remained the rule in Missouri until the decision in
Alsbach.5 7 As the use of hypnotically influenced testimony became more
prevalent, many jurisdictions moved away from a rule of per se admissibility
and seriously considered the problems created by hypnotism. In 1983, the
Harding court reexamined the scientific data on hypnosis and reversed itself
in favor of a rule of per se inadmissibility.58 Both the Sprynczynatyk and
Alsbach courts rejected the Harding approach as being too liberal in allowing
the admission of potentially unreliable and prejudicial testimony.5 9
A second line of authority, which Chief Justice Higgins refers to as the
"recent and persuasive trend,"0 influenced the Supreme Court of Missouri
also to adopt a rule of per se inadmissibility of testimony that has been
influenced by the use of hypnosis. 6' This line of authority is premised upon
the rule set forth in Frye v. United States.62 The Frye rule (arising from the
refusal to admit as evidence the results of a primitive form of the polygraph)
states that in order for deductions made from scientific testing to be admis-
sible as evidence, the test involved must be "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." ' 63 Even
see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Theoretically, had the scientific testi-
mony been more complete, the court might have found that under the present rec-
ollection refreshed rule the use of hypnosis was impermissibly suggestive, and thus
exclude the testimony of the witness.
56. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp.
252 ( E.D. Mich. 1977); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); State
v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983);
State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Ct. App.'1981); Chapman v. State, 638
P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
57. See supra note 6.
58. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272, aff'd, 296 Md. 670,
464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
59. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122; Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 825.
60. Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 824.
61. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d
1266 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986);
State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909 (1985); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App.
186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); People v.
Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), aff'd, 415 Mich. 615, 329
N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer,
210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d
929 (1981); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984); Commonwealth
v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97. 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
62. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
63. Id. at 1014.
19861
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though this rule is not universally accepted, 64 it is followed by many state
and federal courts. Although hypnosis has been accepted as both a verifiable
phenomenon and a therapeutic tool by the American Medical Association
since 1958,65 the usefulness of the technique in fact finding is, at best, con-
sidered unproven.66 On this basis courts applying the Frye test have held that
the use of hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory or elicit new information
renders that witness' testimony inadmissible as to the events discussed under
hypnosis. 67
Alsbach had argued that the Frye rule was inapplicable to the question
of hypnosis because the hypnosis of a witness is not a scientific test or
experiment, the result of which is to be testified to by an expert witness, nor
is it a method by which the veracity of the witness is determined, such as
the polygraph. 68 The court responded that this argument rests on the lan-
guage, but not the purpose of the Frye rule: "It]he purpose of the rule is to
prevent the jury from being misled by unproven and unsound scientific meth-
ods. ' 69 Other courts have stated that the Frye rule is based on the proposition
that it is unreasonable to expect a jury of twelve laymen to resolve scientific
controversies. 0
In his dissent, Judge Blackmar suggests that although hypnosis may in-
deed alter the witness' memory of events, where the human memory is in-
volved the adversarial system has long acknowleged unreliability and developed
procedures to deal with it. 7' Thus, absent a showing of improper suggestion
on the part of the hypnotist, the effect of hypnosis creates no greater danger
of unreliability than normal recall and is therefore acceptable.72
64. At the federal level there has been some debate as to whether the Frye
rule has been superceded by FED. R. EvID. 403. This question has not been author-
itatively resolved; however a suggested solution to the problem is that Frye fits within
FED. R. EVID. 403 because the relative reliability of a scientific procedure can be
compared to its probative value or possible unfair prejudice. See infra notes 89-92;
see, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 nn.18-20 (1984); United States
v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1983). For an execellent discussion of the
issue, see Symposium on Science and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187
(1983).
65. Council on Mental Health, American Medical Association, Medical Use
of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
66. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text; see also Council on Sci-
entific Affairs, American Medical Association, Scientific Status of Refreshing Rec-
ollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J.A.M.A. 1918 (1985).
67. See supra note 61.
68. Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 828.
69. Id. at 829.
70. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); State
v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984) (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
71. Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 830 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
72. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (The court held that if
the hypnotic procedure used in a particular case "was reasonably likely to result in
802 [Vol. 51
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss3/5
POST-HYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
Judge Blackmar's argument fails to take into account the potential of
hypnosis for aggravating the unreliability inherent in human memory. Al-
though we must accept the imperfection of the human mind, this imperfection
can hardly serve as justification for practices which aggravate an already
difficult situation.73 Moreover, while we have developed an adversarial system
which has as a central purpose the winnowing out of unreliable or untruthful
testimony, much of the problem of hypnosis is that it may directly defeat
the devices the system uses to achieve this purpose.7 4
The Sprynczynatyk court, and the Missouri court of appeals which fol-
lowed its decision, declined to adopt either of these approaches to the prob-
lem.75 Chief among the Sprynczynatyk court's concerns was that by removing
the matter from the district court's discretion, a per se inadmissible rule may
deprive fact finders of accurate and valuable evidence, while a per se ad-
missible rule would allow into evidence potentially unreliable testimony and
in some cases create a risk of grave injustice. 76 The rule adopted by the
Eighth Circuit panel attempts to tread the narrow ground between these two
perceived evils by disallowing hypnotically altered testimony in those cases
in which the circumstances surrounding the hypnotic procedures pose an
unnecessary risk of creating unreliable memories in the witness.
The rule adopted in Sprynczynatyk closely follows the rule first proposed
in Hurd v. State,77 which prescibes a procedure for employing hypnosis which,
according to its proponents, largely reduces the dangers inherent in the hyp-
nosis of potential witnesses. 78 The question of admissibility is to be decided
by the court at a pretrial hearing. The burden of proof, which requires a
showing that the offered testimony is reasonably reliable, lies with the party
recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory the testimony would be
admissable." Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 95.).
73. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
74. Those aspects which particularly work to defeat the system are: the wit-
ness' inability to distinguish between truthful and false memories (thus rendering fear
of perjury no deterrent against falsehood); the unconscious homogenization of the
remembered elements of the event into a cohesive story; and the abnormal confidence
of the witness in his story in the post-hypnotic state. See supra notes 41-49 and
accompanying text.
75. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123.
76. Id. at 1122.
77. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (Law
Div. 1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
78. The leading proponent of the procedural safeguard approach is Dr. Martin
T. Orne, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and Director of
the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry and Senior Attending Psychiatrist at the Institute
of Pennsylvania Hospital. Dr. Orne is editor in chief of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF CUNICAL AND ExPERiMENTAL HYPNosIs. Dr. Orne has testified extensively in both
the state and federal courts as an expert witness regarding the use of hypnosis in
memory enhancement, including the Sprynczynatyk case and Hurd. See, e.g., Spryn-
cynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1116; Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. at 343-49, 414 A.2d at 296-99.
1986] 803
11
Young: Young: Breaking from the Hurd
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
seeking to introduce the testimony. 79 However, the standard of proof is not
discussed in the Sprynczynatyk opinion, and the Hurd opinion apparently
left the matter undecided in regard to civil cases.8 0
The first element of the Hurd rule is that the trial court should consider
the type of memory sought to be revived and the reason why the witness has
been deprived of that memory. According to the scientific data relied upon
in formulating the rule, hypnosis works as a reliable memory restorer only
in those cases in which memory loss is attributable to a pathological con-
dition, such as traumatic neurosis, which causes a complete blockage of the
subject's recollection of the event.8 '
Secondly, the court should examine the procedure employed in the hyp-
notic sessions. The Sprynczynatyk Court adopts five standards 2 which, if
applied correctly, provide some protection against unreliable results directly
attributable to the procedure employed. 83
First, the hypnotic session should be conducted by an impartial licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist who is trained in the use of hypnosis and is thus
aware of its possible effects on memory so as to aid in the prevention of
improper suggestions and confabulation. The party's selection of a psychi-
atrist or psychologist should first be approved by the court.Y
Second, information given to the hypnotist by either party concerning
the case should be noted, preferably in written form, so that the extent of
79. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123.
80. In State v. Hurd, the burden placed upon the proponent in a criminal case
is that of clear and convincing evidence. 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. However,
the court pointed out that this degree of proof may not be required in civil trials,
and that not all the standards need apply in civil cases. Id. at 547, 432 A.2d at 97.
No later case in New Jersey has offered further explanation of these issues.
81. The difficulty in cases in which there is no traumatic memory loss is that
the subject may simply not have been cognitive of the facts sought by the interrogator,
and having no genuine recall of the event is much more susceptible to suggestion,
see supra note 41, or confabulation, see supra note 42.
82. The Hurd opinion lists six different procedural considerations. 86 N.J. at
533, 432 A.2d at 89-90. The rule as set forth in Sprynczynatyk combines two of these
considerations, the qualification and impartiality of the hypnotist. Thus, the proce-
dural element of the rule contains only five enumerated elements yet it is not sub-
stantively different from the Hurd rule. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123 n. 14.
83. These rules have been propounded by Dr. Orne in several publications.
See, e.g., Orne, supra note 41; M.T. ORNE, D. DINGES, E.C. ORNE, & M.H. ToNFY,
HYPNOTICALLY REFRsiED TSTIMoNY: EiANCED MEMORY OR TAiMPERNG wrrH EVIDENCE
(January 1985) (Published by National Institute for Justice, U.S. Department of
Justice). These rules have also been adopted in part by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
84. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123 n.14. The hypnotist may be compensated
by one of the parties in the same way as any other consultant or expert witness.
Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545 n.5, 432 A.2d at 96 n.5.
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information that the subject may have received from the hypnotist may be
determined at a later date.8 1
Third, prior to hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain a detailed descrip-
tion of the facts from the subject, avoiding adding new elements to the
subject's description.8 6
Fourth, the session should be recorded so a permanent record is available
to examine for evidence of suggestive procedures. Videotape is the preferred
method of recordation.8 7
Last, only the hypnotist and subject should be present during any phase
of the hypnotic session, but other persons should be allowed to attend if
their attendance can be shown' to be essential and steps are taken to prevent
their influencing the results of the session.8
In light of all relevant circumstances, the final decision on admissibility
is left to the district judge under Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.89 The
court shall weigh in its decision the degree to which the witness' story is
corroborated by independent evidenceP9 Under the rule's balancing test, the
question becomes whether the testimony sought to be introduced bears enough
indicia of reliablility for its probative value to outweigh the possible unfair
prejudice and the risk of unreliablity to the opposing party caused by the
admission of the hypnotically altered testimony. 9' The court states, "We are
satisfied that, if the session is properly conducted in appropriate cases, the
hypnotically enhanced testimony does not run afoul of the Frye test to the
extent that it is applicable." 92
It should be noted that two of the most important elements of the Hurd
rule, as adopted by the Sprynczynatyk court, are not among the enumerated
procedural standards. 93 These two elements are that the subject must suffer




89. FED. R. EVID. 403 states:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
90. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; see infra notes 104-07.
91. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; see also supra note 64.
92. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122 n.14. The court did not explain this
conclusory assertion, and it is questionable in light of the scientific research of other
authors. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 41.
93. In discussing the Hurd approach, one should resist the tempation to refer
only to the enumerated rules. The court in State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649
P.2d 845 (1982), cites Hurd with apparent approval but lists only the procedural
requirements as a "comprehensive set of standards for the admissibility of hypnot-
ically induced recollections." Id. at 736, 649 P.2d at 847.
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from some pathological memory loss 94 and that there be some corroborative
evidence to support the assertions made as a result of the hypnotic influence.95
The requirement that the subject be suffering from pathological memory
loss should be the starting point, and as this is a relatively rare condition,
in most cases the ending point of the admissibility question.96 Pathological
memory loss differs from a normal failure to remember in that the subject
has, due to some trauma, completely lost the ability to consciously com-
municate his or her memory of the event in question. 97 In such a case, once
the hypnotist succeeds in breaking the barrier to conscious recall, the event
can be related in narrative form or with only general questioning.98 The role
of hypnosis in such cases more closely resembles hypnosis' medically ap-
proved 99 therapeutic use than it does hypnosis' dubious qualities as a fact
finding tool.
As shown in the Sprynczynatyk and Alsbach cases, the purpose of the
hypnotic session is often not to retrieve a memory blocked by the subconcious
but rather to elicit a more detailed description of an event readily commu-
nicated before hypnosis.' °° This use of hypnosis greatly aggravates the risks
of a fallacious result for two reasons: the repeated questioning creates an
atmosphere especially conducive to suggested or confabulated "memories," 0'
and the reason the subject does not recall a detail prior to hypnosis is often
that the subject did not have the opportunity or the motivation at the time
of the event to be cognitive of the detail sought. 0 2 In such a situation there
is no memory to be refreshed, only a strong motivation to comply with the
hypnotist's request to provide more details. 03
The requirement of corroboration ,o4 also limits the use of hypnosis as
well as offering some protection from the risks inherent in it. 01 Corroboration
94. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; Hurd, 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
95. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123.
96. The language of the Hurd opinion makes this point clear: "Once it is
determined that a case is of a kind likely to yield normal recall ... then it is necessary
to determine whether the procedures followed were reasonably reliable." Hurd, 86
N.J. at, 544, 432 A.2d at 96.
97. See Ore, supra note 41, at 324.
98. Id. at 325. By allowing the subject to narrate without prodding the hyp-
notist greatly reduces the risk of creating false 'memories.' See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
99. See supra note 65.
100. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1115; Alsbach, 770 S.W.2d at 823.
101. E. LoFrus, EYEwITNEss TEMsIMONY 72-74, 94-99 (1979). On one hand the
questions themselves may suggest the answer ("Did you see the gun?"). On the other
hand, even if the questions are kept content neutral, the act of searching for infor-
mation creates the impression that the subject should add something more to the
story. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
102. Orne, supra note 41, at 328.
103. Supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
104. See Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d
1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984); Orne, supra note 41.
105. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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provides the court with further indicia of reliability as an aid to determine
admissibility" 6 and also lessens the dependence of the ultimate finder of
fact on the hypnotically altered testimony. Another important benefit of this
requirement is that if the court encounters discrepencies rather than corro-
boration during this inquiry the discrepancies should weigh heavily against
admission of the testimony. 0 7
In deciding whether a finding that the proposed testimony is inadmissible
should also render the witness' testimony about what was remembered prior
to hypnosis inadmissible, both the Eighth Circuit panel and the Missouri
Supreme Court followed the majority rule'018 and held that if the prior
memory is sufficiently documented'0 9 as such and is "uncontaminated" by
the hypnosis, the witness may testify about events remembered prior to having
been hypnotized." 0
Although strict adherence to the rule adopted in Sprynczynatyk would
preclude many of the applications of hypnosis and forbid most of its more
flagrant abuses,' the rule of conditional admissibility fails to address several
important problems that arise when introduction of hypnotically altered tes-
timony is sought.
First among these considerations is the amount of resources expended
in the pretrial hearing on admissibility. Although the proponent of the tes-
timony bears the burden of proof at this hearing, the opponent must present
countervailing arguments. As the most -common use of hypnotically refreshed
testimony is in criminal cases, this puts an added burden on defense counsel.
106. See Diamond, supra note 41, at 338-39 (pointing out that any corrobor-
ative evidence should be made known neither to the hypnotist nor to the subject
before hypnosis to avoid the risk of the creation of "memories" to match the facts).
107. For example, in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), the court
points out at least four obvious factual discrepencies in the witness' posthypnotic
account of events. Id. at 772.
108. This is the rule among those jurisdictions which limit or completely ban
the use of hypnotically altered testimony. See supra note 61. Only California holds
that the witness is not to testify concerning any matter related to the subject of the
hypnotic session. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal Rptr. 243,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). However, this rule has been relaxed to allow ad-
mission of statements and identifications made prior to hypnosis. See People v.
Thompson, 176 Cal. 3d 554, 222 Cal.Rptr. 262 (1986).
109. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
110. Although not discussed in Sprynczynatyk or Alsbach, by allowing the
witness to testify concerning prehypnotic memories, the use of hypnosis as a forensic
tool in law enforcement is largely preserved. Even where the posthypnotic testimony
of the witness is inadmissible the witness will probably not be precluded from testi-
fying to the occurrence of the event itself, although unable to testify as to any details
uncovered through hypnosis. Nonetheless, these details may prove to be quite valuable
to law enforcement authorities in that they may lead to independently admissible
evidence.




Young: Young: Breaking from the Hurd
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
808 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 51
Expert witnesses against the admission of the testimony may be difficult to
obtain without adequate funds" 2 while under the Hurd rule the proponent
has at least one expert witness at the ready, the hypnotist." 3
A case by case determination of admissability may also have an adverse
effect on limited judicial resources." 4 Because the scientific community has
divergent opinions on the use of hypnosis, the pretrial hearing certainly has
the potential of becoming a battle of experts, requiring extensive briefing,
testimony, and argument concerning the medical condition of the witness," 5
the validity of the procedures used in obtaining the witness' prehypnotic
statements and in conducting and recording the hypnotic session," 6 the po-
tential for sugguestion or confabulation in each question or comment made
to the witness," 7 and the qualifications of the hypnotist," 8 as well as any
facts or circumstances which may be relevent to the court's decision on the
admissibility of the witness' posthypnotic testimony." 9
If the court does decide to admit the posthypnotic testimony, counsel
may then choose to relitigate the issues concerning the unreliability of pos-
thypnotic testimony before the jury for the purpose of impeaching the hyp-
notized witness. 20 If the court rules the posthypnotic testimony inadmissable,
it is then necessary to determine if the witness has been so effected by the
hypnosis as to render her account of prehypnotic statements also inadmis-
sible; if this testimony is allowable there may also be some question as to
112. For a particularly Malthusian answer to this problem, see State v. Little,
674 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), in which the court states that a "resourceful
lawyer would not be helpless in obtaining expert information sufficient for a prelim-
inary inquiry, at little or no expense." Id. at 544.
113. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. As required by the procedural
guidelines, the hypnotist must be either a psychiatrist or a psychologist with specialized
training in hypnosis. The use of the hypnotist who is partially the subject of the
inquiry as an expert on hypnosis can itself raise some problems. While a balanced
professional opinion should be expected from the hypnotist, under these rules the
fact that the psychiatrist or psychologist was willing to assist in the attempt to restore
the witness' memory through hypnosis is indicative of at least some degree of bias
in favor of the reliability of hypnosis as a fact finding device. Alsbach, 770 S.W.2d
at 839-40 (citing Diamond, supra note 39); see also supra notes 53-55 and accom-
panying text.
114. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 207, 644 P.2d 1266,
1294 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
255-56, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
115. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
120. See Hurd v. State, 86 N.J. 525, 544, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981) (The court
suggested limitations on counsel's right to present to the jury evidence on the unreliability
of hypnosis where the court has admitted the testimony after a pretrial hearing.).
16
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the scope of the statements made before hypnosis which must be resolved.12'
A second problem with the Sprynczynatyk rule is that although the
procedural standards provide control over intentional suggestion and con-
ditions particularly conducive to unintentional suggestion, the rule offers no
method by which the court can determine the reliability of the posthypnotic
recollection itself. 122 The rule cannot prevent spontaneous confabulation 23
or aid the court in determining the reliability of any particular facet of the
testimony regardless of the sterility of the hypnotic environment."
A final unanswered problem created by hynotically altered testimony,
even when it meets the requirements of the rule, is the question of increased
confidence and assurance on the part of the witness. 125 Because hypnosis is
a powerful reinforcer of both accurate and false memories, the normal human
trait of questioning one's own recall is largely repressed.' 26 Thus the witness
may exhibit an abnormal degree of confidence in the accuracy of his post-
hypnotic recollection. Because of this artificial certainty in the witness' tes-
timony, several courts have found hypnosis to be a serious infringement on
the right to cross examine, which in a criminal case rises to the level of a
constitutional infirmity.' 27
When faced with a rule which severely restricts the admissibility of hyp-
notically altered testimony, which fails to address several difficult questions,
and which also adds several new problems to a troubled situation, several
courts, including the Missouri Supreme Court, have rejected the Hurd anal-
ysis in favor of the per se inadmissible rule simply because "the game is not
worth the candle."' 28
Although the opinion in Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors adopting the
Hurd rule of conditional admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony
is a vast improvement over the ill founded and discredited Harding rule of
per se admisibility, its practical application may prove it to be well intentioned
yet ill advised. If applied correctly it will effectively end the use of hypnot-
ically altered testimony in the federal courts of the Eighth Circuit. If this is
the desired result, then it would be a much more efficient use of resources
to ban the use of hypnosis altogether as did the Missouri Supreme Court in
121. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
122. The court in Hurd characterized the reliablility of testimony admissible
under the rule as comparable to that of normal eyewitness testimony and therefore
acceptable. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
123. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
126. Diamond, supra note 41, at 300; Orne, supra note 41, at 326.
127. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 187-89, 644 P.2d
1266, 1273-75 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980).
128. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787-88, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 256, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
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AIsbach. The unreliablility of hypnosis as a memory restorer has not yet
been fully explained by science. Until the scientific community can provide
the unequivocal answers needed to make a principled judgment as to when,
or whether, the hypnosis of a witness is a legally acceptable procedure it is
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